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I have a terribly difﬁcult task, because I have very little to add after
such excellent presentations by three wise men, Stanley Fischer, whom I
worked for in the World Bank, Jeffrey Goldstein of the World Bank, and
Professor Yoshitomi. What I would like to do is to give you a slightly
unorthodox view of ﬁnancial crisis and to think laterally about why we
need national risk management to prevent the next crisis.
THE IDENTIFICATION OF RISK
I start with the troubling thought that mainstream development
economics over the last 50 years has been obsessed with achieving high
growth, since growth was associated with development and the eradica-
tion of poverty. But there was no clear realization that high growth can be
achieved only at high risk. Developing countries really need to think very
carefully about how to manage the risks of growth on a national basis
rather than on a sectoral basis.
Basically speaking, the 1970s sovereign debt crisis arose because
governments bet on promoting growth through huge domestic and
external borrowing. After that crisis was resolved through IMF restraints
on ﬁscal imprudence, the crises of the 1980s and the Asian crisis erupted
because the private sector took huge risks through excessive leverage. It
was widely believed that as long as the public sector did not run large
deﬁcits, the engine of national growth through the private sector would
be self-stabilizing. Of course, that turned out to be wrong. Private sector
mistakes can destabilize economies as much as public policy errors.
*Chairman, Securities & Futures Commission, Hong Kong.Consequently, what we really need to focus on is the need to manage
sectoral risks, which add up to national risks. And national risks add up
to global risks. In essence, ﬁnancial crisis—which covers banking crisis,
currency crisis, and debt crisis—can really be reduced to two fundamen-
tal types: either a solvency crisis or a liquidity crisis. Now solvency crises
can destroy individual companies, ﬁnancial institutions, or whole eco-
nomic sectors through the liquidation mechanism, but in practice, you
cannot liquidate a sovereign nation. Countries generally face liquidity
crises, even though some of them could be technically insolvent. So the
question is, how do we prevent ﬁnancial crisis through national risk
management?
RISK MANAGEMENT AND THE FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE
Former IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus said in a recent
speech that when he was dealing with the international ﬁnancial archi-
tecture, he realized that he was in reality a ﬁreman. It is difﬁcult dealing
with architectural issues when you are ﬁre ﬁghting. What I interpreted
from his comment was that we are dealing with the process of change and
how we cope with change. It reminded me of the key lesson of my study
in the early 1990s, when I worked at the World Bank, surveying the
lessons of banking crises in the 1980s. The lesson was this: Financial crisis
is an event but bank restructuring is a process.
Financial markets involve many different processes—trading, clear-
ing, settlement, and payment. Different institutions run these processes,
and they behave very differently under different circumstances, especially
in normal times and during a crisis. For example, fair value accounting is
all about accounting, under normal market conditions. But we all know
that fair value accounting does not work at all during a crisis. During a
crisis, there is no fair market value, since assets may have to be sold at
liquidation prices in order to obtain liquidity.
What I am saying is that our present ﬁnancial structure is funda-
mentally designed for normal events, whereby banks behave normally
with a banking book that is priced for normal times. The process that
takes care of the spike in interest rates is the lender of last resort function
of the central bank. In a solvency or liquidity crisis—the spike—the
bankers run to the central bank for liquidity. Without liquidity, interest
rates rise further, and at excessively high interest rates, all banking books
could become insolvent when assets are marked to market. The market
panics when it realizes that the depository of public savings, the banking
system, may be insolvent.
Consequently, the Bagehot dictum that central banks should lend
freely against collateral during a crisis is the process by which central
banks provide liquidity for the market to restore normal conditions as
soon as possible. During these times, a central banker is a market
238 Andrew Shengbookmaker, providing liquidity at a price when no one else is willing to
provide liquidity. In a closed economy, a central bank can print money to
provide domestic liquidity. But in an open, global market environment,
the ball game is very different for the lender of last resort.
THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN OUR FINANCIAL NETWORKS
Instead of waxing about global ﬁnancial architecture, we should
think in process or engineering terms. In technical terminology, ﬁnancial
systems or markets are essentially networks. We have securities market
networks, banking market networks, insurance market networks, trading
and commercial networks, all linked through hubs of exchanges or
clearing houses or through electronic communication network (ECN)
“crossing” of trades.
The trouble with this architecture is that it evolved through loose
alliances and mergers, and no one actually sat down to design the global
network. As we know, networks have both positive and negative
externalities. Networks create leverage whereby one participant can
exchange and use another participant’s resources. Wide networks allow
complex multi-modal relationships to be entered into, in which leverage
can be many tiered.1 The unfortunate part is that if one component of that
leverage chain fails, the whole network may fail. In other words,
leveraging actually accentuates or multiplies the interdependency of
markets through the global market network.
Today, the global ﬁnancial market has evolved through a patchwork
of various local area networks linking together banking, securities,
insurance, asset management, and real trades. The ﬂaw of any patchwork
of networks is that it is only as robust as its weakest link. And the trouble
is that in the global area network, local networks were not traditionally
designed to take global shocks. Most domestic ﬁnancial systems have
been designed on the basis that the central bank takes care of the spike,
which typically originates domestically.
Once domestic ﬁnancial systems got integrated to the global econ-
omy through trade and ﬁnancial liberalization, domestic systems became
vulnerable to external shocks. In Asia, US$300 billion arrived in the form
of capital inﬂows to the four crisis economies in the three years prior to
the crisis, and roughly US$200 billion was withdrawn in the two years
post-crisis, mostly in bank credit. This tidal wave of foreign currency
ﬂows overwhelmed whatever central bank reserves were available to
defend ﬁxed exchange rates.
An interesting lesson from bank failures in the 1980s was that the
1 In other words, derivatives enable a single capital base to support multiple leveraging
with many counterparties.
THE IMPORTANCE OF RISK MANAGEMENT 239worst part of the crisis came when you had to rescue the rescuer. If you
look at every single major banking crisis in the 1980s, beginning with the
U.S. S&L crisis, it was not the banks failing that ﬁrst forced the politicians
to take action. It was either the deposit insurance scheme or the central
bank becoming insolvent that forced the politicians to wake up.
Consequently, the resilience of the domestic network design to stress
is very important to the global architecture. How do we design the local
area networks that are our domestic ﬁnancial systems to become resilient
to take global shocks? Using a simple example, the Long-Term Capital
Management (LTCM) value-at-risk model was designed to operate con-
vergence trading when markets historically moved a maximum of four
standard deviations. The Russian crisis caused the markets to move 15
standard deviations, so LTCM went bust. It was the same story with the
Asian crisis economies. Those ﬁnancial systems were essentially designed
in the 1960s and 1970s for domestic savings mobilization purposes. The
authorities never dreamt that their systems would be subject to such
exchange rate or capital ﬂow shocks.
RISK MANAGEMENT
Let me now turn to the issues of valuation, liquidity, and risk
management. As I said earlier, the banking loan book is normally based
upon historical cost value. Banks now mark their trading book using
market prices, typically using the mean of bid-ask spreads of known
prices trading under normal conditions. However, as LTCM found out
during the Russian crisis, there was no “fair value” during the ﬁnancial
crisis, when everybody went for cover. Consequently, fair market prices
are all dependent upon market liquidity and cash ﬂows. But during a
ﬁnancial crisis, liquidity dries up if there is no buyer of last resort. In
providing liquidity to the market, the central bank has become the buyer
of last resort. And if no one acts in that role during a crisis, once the
liquidity begins to dry up and there is no price at which you can obtain
liquidity, even the most solvent of economies can be overwhelmed. This
is what happened to Korea during the Asian crisis.
CONCLUSIONS
The ﬁrst conclusion I draw from all this is that we now have a global
problem, in which there is no ofﬁcial lender of last resort or liquidity
provider of last resort when global markets begin to panic for one reason
or another. The major shareholders, for moral hazard reasons, will not
permit the IMF to fulﬁll that function. The logical answer to all this is that
domestic ﬁnancial systems will therefore have to be designed to take
global shocks at higher levels than before.
The second conclusion that I draw is that we need to look at risks
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that market risk can be differentiated from credit risk. But as the LTCM
crisis has shown vividly, during the ﬁnancial crisis you cannot distin-
guish a market risk from a credit risk. In essence, a liquidity crisis
transmits very quickly across the global network to become a solvency
crisis.
Taken together, both conclusions suggest that we really need to
rethink our global architecture and the way we manage our risks
domestically. We have to worry about how risks emerge in different parts
of our economy and our ﬁnancial markets, how systemic risks interplay
between the different components, and how such risks interact with
external forces. We need to identify these sectoral, national, and global
risks, and then we need to hedge or shift these risks. Small economies and
domestic ﬁnancial systems cannot depend on the international architec-
ture to handle these global risks.
Seen from this angle of national risk management, let me try and
answer the question that seems to stand out during the Asian crisis: Why
is it that economies with high central bank reserves and lower debt
survived the shocks better? In hindsight, the answer is very simple. The
Modigliani-Miller theorem tells us that asset diversiﬁcation reduces risks.
But these assets must be negatively correlated with each other. For these
small banks in small economies that cannot diversify their risks, the one
asset that is 100 percent negatively correlated with their domestic risks is
foreign exchange reserves. And I am not talking about gross reserves, it
has to be net reserves. Again, as the LTCM crisis showed, during a
ﬁnancial crisis, it is not net liabilities that matter, but gross liabilities.
Consequently, the central bank must have deep net foreign exchange
reserves to be able to absorb all these global shocks on the domestic
economy.
To conclude, we really now need to think about how we manage
national risks in a volatile global market. And the only way you can
manage these risks is through good information. Unfortunately, we still
have very poor information to manage our risks. Why do I say this? We
base all our statistics on accounting information. As we heard earlier in
this conference, we have poor accounting either because we do not apply
international accounting standards, or because the standards are not
properly enforced or implemented. How many banks and state-owned
enterprises in this world are operating on the basis that they are solvent
in accounting terms, but are economically insolvent, if their balance
sheets are properly marked to market? I call these insolvent banks and
enterprises “zombies.” Since their losses are quasi-ﬁscal deﬁcits, and they
are still operating actively in many markets, how can the rest of the
market price their risks correctly? If we are not pricing and managing
these credit and market risks correctly, then many of these zombies must
be heading for the next crisis.
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banking system in Asia. I have now worked in the banking systems in
Asia for the past 30 years. Over those 30 years, banks in Asia have had at
least three cycles of bank crises, with levels of nonperforming loans
peaking at around 15 percent in the 1970s and 1980s, to as much as 50
percent of total bank loans this time round. What has been done in Asia
is to recapitalize all these banks at huge public cost. But guess what the
average net bank spreads are in Asia today? Roughly 1 percent after
administrative costs. How can a net bank spread of 1 percent cover an
average statistically of about 10 to 15 percent in nonperforming loan
provisions over 30 years? The answer is that the banks will again fail, if
spreads do not adequately cover loan loss provisions.
Clearly, if bank intermediation continues in Asia along the old way
with narrow spreads, some banks in Asia will have to be recapitalized
once again. If banks still price their risks depending upon central banks
to bail them out, then we have not eliminated a key moral hazard. That
is why I think we really need to build much deeper securities markets and
bond markets in Asia to enable the economies, the sectors, and the
enterprises to manage and diversify their risks properly.
On top of that, we need the most fundamental building brick and the
real foundation of efﬁcient markets, which is high-quality and timely
information. As long as we do not have timely and reliable information,
we have terribly shaky foundations, where a ﬁnancial system may still
collapse the next time global shocks arrive. As we all know, no two
ﬁnancial crises are the same. And you can bet your bottom dollar, there
will be another ﬁnancial crisis.
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